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Abstract  
In this article, I use Albert Hirschman's consumer-based 'exit' and 'voice' concepts in order to set out the 
political ecology of voice (PEV), an innovative theoretical framework that aims to examine the causes of 
environmental pollution from a new angle. I begin by providing a brief overview of political ecology, and 
why it provides such a useful framework from which to position Hirschman's ideas of exit and voice. This 
will lead into a more detailed analysis of Hirschman's theories in an environmental context, and why the 
use of voice by various stakeholders (citizens, community based organizations (CBOs) and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)) is dependent upon a number of political, economic, social and 
geographical factors over a specific temporal period. The study of voice through PEV will enable 
researchers to examine the accountability of economic actors for incidents of environmental pollution.  
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Résumé 
Dans cet article, je utiliser les concepts de la sortie (exit) et la voix (voice) d'Albert Hirschman afin de 
définir l'écologie politique de la voix (PEV), un cadre théorique novateur qui vise à examiner les causes de 
la pollution de l'environnement à partir d'un nouvel angle. Je commence par donner un bref aperçu de 
l'écologie politique et pourquoi il offre un tel cadre utile pour positionner les idées de Hirschman de la 
sortie et de la voix. Cela nous mène à une analyse plus détaillée des théories de Hirschman dans ce contexte 
environnemental. Je examine l'utilisation de la voix par les parties prenantes (citoyens, les organisations 
communautaires de base (OCB), et les organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG)). Son utilisation est 
tributaire d'un certain nombre de facteurs politiques, économiques, sociales et géographiques sur une 
période de temps spécifique. L'étude des voix à travers PEV permet aux chercheurs d'examiner la 
responsabilité des acteurs économiques pour les incidents de pollution de l'environnement. 
Mots-clés: Albert Hirschman, l'écologie politique de la voix 
 
Resumen 
En este artículo utilizo los conceptos de Albert Hirschman de "salida"  y "voz" para desarrollar una 
"ecología política de la voz" (PEV por sus siglas en inglés), y examinar desde esa perspectiva las causas de 
la contaminación ambiental.  Empiezo con una revisión de la literatura sobre ecología política, y explico 
porque ese acercamiento teórico beneficia de la integración de los conceptos de ?salida? y ?voz? de 
Hirschman.  Sigo con un detallado análisis de las teorías de Hirschman en un contexto ambiental, y discuto 
porque el uso de ?voz? por parte de interesados tales como ciudadanos, organizaciones basadas en la 
comunidad y organizaciones no gubernamentales depende de varios factores políticos, económicos, 
sociales y geográficos durante un tiempo determinado.  El estudio de ?voz? desde la perspectiva de la PEV 
ayuda  identificar la responsabilidad de los actores económicos para la contaminación ambiental. 
Palabras clave: Albert Hirschman, ecología política de la voz 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The causes and consequences of environmental pollution are numerous. In a broad sense, pollution 
can be caused by industrial operational failures, mismanagement or poor standards, weak environmental 
regulation at various spatial levels (local, national, regional, international) and economic influences, to 
name but a few. Our understanding of these factors rests on our ability to engage with the intricate, often 
inter-connected processes that lie behind the pollution problem, a target most readily achieved through solid 
  
theoretical and methodological foundations. Work identified with post-ecologism (Bluhdorn and Welsh 
2007), environmental racism (Bullard 1993) and ecological distribution conflicts (Martinez-Alier 2004), 
has begun to do this. 
This article aims to build on existing research and the understanding of pollution problems through 
the presentation of an innovative approach termed 'the political ecology of voice' (PEV), which combines 
a political ecology framework with the theory of voice developed by Albert Hirschman. PEV can be defined 
as the study of a specific temporal, economic, social, and geographical environment in which various 
stakeholders (e.g. citizens, community based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)) utilize their voice over an environmental issue. PEV is able to draw together these temporally 
influenced factors and, taken together, it forms a comprehensive theory also capable of influencing 
stakeholders and holding economic actors to account for pollution. 
A study of voice from an environmentally based context, its application, the influences upon it and 
the feasibility of success are not new research strands. Studies surrounding the theme of voice include 
exploring community-based natural resource management (Agrawal and Gibson 1999), participatory 
relationships between managers and local people in environmental and developmental situations (Bixler et 
al. 2015), governance interactions between actors involved in environmental management (Andersson 
2004), efforts by local communities to gain access and power over natural resource management  (Boelens 
et al. 2010) and the process of negotiation between companies and communities (Le Meur et al. 2013). In 
some areas, particularly research examining participatory approaches, there are clear similarities with voice 
through its efforts at understanding the level and nature of engagement (Bixler et al. 2015) between various 
actors and the study of the opportunity of individual freedom in pursuit of developmental outcomes (Sen 
2001). However, the generalized nature of these theories requires greater placement within institutional and 
environmental histories (Bixler et al. 2015: 177). A stronger theoretical framework can examine these 
influences and their impact on participation. PEV offers one such approach. In other studies, voice-related 
issues would appear to emerge out of other investigatory themes (Hinojosa et al. 2015: 111-112) or through 
the application of different theoretical perspectives (Le Meur et al. 2013 on diffusion processes), making 
voice appear to be a by-product of other influences. This should by no means be seen as criticism of existing 
research, which has been vital to help improve our understanding of the difficulties of environmental 
management, the relationship and interaction between actors and the implications of poor governance. 
Through PEV, the study of voice can become an explicitly stated aim of research, strengthened 
through a theory that can help researchers map out and understand the complexities surrounding the 
application of voice, retain analytical focus on voice and examine its placement within institutional and 
environmental histories. By doing so, it is hoped that this innovative theoretical approach will help improve 
our understanding of the causes of environmental pollution. 
The first section of this article outlines the academic school of political ecology and why voice can 
be sited so successfully within it. This is followed by an exploration into Hirschman's theories and why 
voice can be integrated into an environmental context. The final section explores how the contextual 
influences surrounding the application of voice by citizens can be combined with certain aspects of political 
ecology (power, space and time) in order to form PEV. The arguments are illustrated through secondary-
sourced examples taken from different parts of the world in order highlight how the approach is relevant 
for the study of different pollution-based scenarios.  
 
2. Political ecology  
 
"We consciously seek to avoid disciplining political ecology….To the contrary, we 
encourage the flourishing of political ecology to include the fullest possible range of 
approaches." (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003: 2)   
 
Political ecology has been described and used in so many different ways that according to some 
commentators, it has little overlap in meaning (Biersack 1999: 11; Newman 2005: 3) and the range of 
approaches and modifiers to the term testify to this argument (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a; Bryant 2015a; 
1992; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Forsyth 2003; Perreault et al. 2015). Despite its flexibility as an analytical 
perspective or framework, there are a number of visible starting points which provide a degree of coherence 
to the field while still leaving space for exploration (Neumann 2005: 10). A foray into political ecology not 
  
only highlights the academic space available to site PEV but more importantly reveals that many of its 
interlinked elements offer striking integration with Hirschman's theory of voice. 
The term political ecology is constructed "through the merger of cultural ecology with political 
economy" (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a: 17), the latter utilised in a broad sense (Newman 2005: 9; Watts 
2015) and in this article can be understood "…to refer in general terms to the politics of environmental 
problems without specific focus on the ecology" (Forsyth 2003: 4). Within second- generational political 
ecology, important consideration is given to political, economic and social structures and their institutions, 
and how these impact the human construction, transformation and management of already humanized 
'natural' ecosystems (Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a; 1987b; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Ioris 
2011; Newmann 2005; Peet et al. 2011; Watts 2015: 32-34). From this broad premise, there are a number 
of elements that need greater analysis owing to their significance for PEV. 
A central aspect of contemporary political ecology has been its effort to establish a more complex 
understanding of the diverse nature of power and authority and how its relations define, facilitate, manage 
and control human-environmental interactions in differing environmental contexts such as resource 
extraction and land ownership (Batterbury 2015; Bridge 2011; Bryant 1998: 82-85; Neumann 2005). As 
Peet et al. (2011: 31) correctly identify, "…[e]nvironmental problems (and their possible solutions) are 
inevitably entangled with questions of power and governance" which has seen an academic focus on various 
actors including the nation-state (Ioris 2014), businesses (Bebbington et al.  2013) and non-state actors 
(Khan 2013). 
Crucially however, these power relations are often unequal. This is apparent between business actors 
and their relationships with citizens (Cragg and Greenbaum 2002; Himley 2008) and thus become linked 
to conflicts over forms of access and control of natural resources and the implications these have for 
environmental health and sustainable livelihoods (Watts 2000: 257). A vital point is the relationship 
between economic actors like resource extraction industries (REIs) and citizens, and the extent to which 
the former can control and manage the latters' access to decision-making mechanisms surrounding natural 
resource management and environmental problems. 
Similarly, citizens in their participatory relationship with NGOs can often struggle to hold these 
actors to account due to their lack of obvious accountability options. "Unlike donors, [communities] cannot 
withdraw their funding; unlike governments, they cannot impose conditionalities'" (Najam 1996: 346–347). 
They lack 'downward accountability' and power (O'Dwyer and Unerman 2010). Here again, thought must 
be given to the accountability and power relationships between these citizen and non-state actors and the 
way in which debates over environmental pollution and actions taken to combat it are framed.  
Finally, inequality is also present in the utilization of power by the state. Its prioritization of 
industrial interests lends power to dominant economic actors and social groups at the expense of other 
groups whose interests will be marginalized if found to threaten those of the dominant group (Blaikie and 
Brookfield 1987a: 17; Nash and Lewis 2006). The state's diffusion of power, influence and access to 
specific social groups or actors influences how well citizens and civic or non-governmental organisations 
can hold industry or government accountable for pollution incidents. Political ecologists' research into the 
retention and use of power by the state is important, and highlighted in this article.  
Power inequality is not the only factor that can limit individuals and collective group's efforts for 
environmental accountability. Political ecologists highlight how at a macro-level, individual choice and 
action are constrained by an array of spatial, economic, social and historical contextual forces (Lipschutz 
1997: 88-91). Scale, place and time are important aspects of the political ecology framework.  
Scale is important due to its relationship to power (a so-called "politics of scale" (Watts 2000: 158) 
and is thus critical in efforts to identify the occurrence and causes of environmental degradation (Newmann 
2005: 76). Of significance for this article is the possible impact that spatial power relations have on the 
accountability of environmental problems at the state-societal level. Research on the broad question of 
spatial power has been conducted by scholars who examine "frontiers" (Karlsson 2011) and "territories" 
(Greenberg 2006: 127-129; M'Gonigle 1999). Their conclusions are that the state imposes administrative 
and territorial hierarchies to control resources (Greenberg 2006: 127). Spatial-power dynamics often 
involve a concentration of power in the centre which leaves territorial power dispersed through social forms 
in "small villages, local markets and community halls, regions beyond the city" (M'Gonigle 1999: 17). This 
is a type of simplification for the purposes of state control (Karlsson 2011). A challenge for communities 
living in these spatially remote localities, particularly those on the peripheries of mainstream society who 
  
wish for greater rights or self-determination, is to overcome potential state reluctance to devolve and share 
power and to support scale-specific institutions (Silvern 1999: 665-666), an indication of the way that the 
operation of power maps "…social inequalities onto spatial categories" (Moore 1998: 351).  
Consequently, one has to consider how much impact these spatial-power relations have on citizen 
access to state decision making mechanisms, especially for more remotely situated citizens located in places 
like the Amazon rainforest. Oil production sites, for example, are often remote and have the highest power 
densities (measured in Watts per square meter) of any natural energy or anthropogenic feature on earth 
(Cleveland 2007) with REI power coming from their "ability to control specific patches of ground" (Bridge 
2011: 319). In remote geographical locations 'away' from the state, are state functions, and consultation and 
communication sites accessible for local people?  
Lastly, tied to all of these discussions is an awareness that the relationship between political, 
economic, social, and spatial processes and their impact on the environment changes over time (Batterbury 
and Bebbington 1999: 281-282). A focus on past events like the progressive incorporation of emerging 
market and developing economies (EMaDE) into an advanced economy (AE) based system of capitalist 
production provides a crucial understanding for "..contemporary patterns of human-environmental 
interaction and associated power relations" (Bryant 1998: 85). This means political ecology is in part 
historical (Davis 2015). This historical acknowledgement is important given that some factors influencing 
environmental degradation are only visible over long periods of time (Batterbury and Bebbington 1999: 
281), e.g. the effects of population pressure. The distribution of power changes markedly over time (see 
Silvern 1999: 644-645 for a United States example). The influence/power/position of people also changes 
- Hvalkof shows how the Peruvian Ashenika indigenous people "…underwent a metamorphosis" 
transforming from colonist exploited labour through to active political agents of social change and 
democratization (Hvalkof 2006: 197). Modern political ecology reflects this by recognizing the speeding 
of human ingenuity and technological transformations which have made nature unrecognizable (Berglund 
2006: 99; Bryant and Bailey 1997: 5). 
Overall, the focus on these various elements of political ecology (power, spatial location and time) 
reveal the most important areas that bear significant integration with Hirschman's theories in an 
environmentally based context. PEV, like political ecology can be seen to be borne from efforts to promote 
positive social and ecological change and justice (Bridge et al. 2015: 8; Bryant 2015b: 22) and to fight 
against the unjust ways in which politics, economics, culture and ecology come together and help cause 
environmental pollution (Bryant 2015b: 20). This next section of the article will set out how Hirschman's 
theory of voice offers integration with political ecology and the establishment of PEV. 
 
3. Albert Hirschman's exit and voice, and reconceptualization in an environmental 
scenario  
 
"Gaining voice is a struggle but so too is giving voice" (Bryant 2015b: 23) 
 
Albert Hirschman, a founding father of post-WWII development economics and one of the twentieth 
century's most influential economists, set out the theories of exit and voice in Exit, voice and loyalty: 
responses to decline in firms, organizations and states (1970). His ideas were subsequently re-examined 
(Hirschman 1995; 1982; 1981; 1978). As the title suggests, the book was centered on an investigation into 
the distinct consumer responses to a decrease in quality or benefit they perceive from a firm, organization 
or state.  
The exit option will see consumers stop buying a firm's products or members leave an organization 
(Hirschman 1970). This can be neat ("one either exits or one does not" (Hirschman 1970: 15)), impersonal 
(where there is no face-to-face confrontation between customer and firm), indirect (a firm's recovery comes 
through the economic Invisible Hand as an unintended by-product of the customer's decision to shift 
suppliers (Hirschman 1970: 15-16)) and typically as a private, silent decision and activity (Hirschman 1995: 
34). Voice on the other hand will see consumers or an organization's members express their dissatisfaction 
to those in question (Hirschman 1970: 4). Unlike exit, it is labelled as "messy" due to the different gradients 
that encompass voice ("all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest"), public ("implies articulation 
of one's critical opinions rather than a private "secret" vote in the anonymity of a supermarket…") and 
"direct and straightforward" (Hirschman 1970: 16). 
  
Figure 1 provides a "rough summary" of organizations classified in relation to the absence or 
presence of exit and voice (Hirschman 1970: 120). Hirschman acknowledges that there are minimal cases 
where exit and voice play important roles, but does proceed to highlight some examples in the top left hand 
corner of the diagram e.g. some business clients will attempt to influence firm policies directly (via voice) 
instead of choosing exit, though exit remains an option (Hirschman 1970: 121). In contrast, "[t]here are 
probably no organizations that are wholly immune to either exit or voice"; such organizations, as listed in 
the bottom right-hand corner of figure 1, are likely to be less viable long-term (Hirschman 1970: 121). In 
this scenario, exit and voice will only be engaged when deterioration is so highly advanced that recovery is 
either impossible or desired (Hirschman 1970: 121). Despite this, the author makes clear that the former 
organizations (those equipped with exit and voice) are not necessarily more advanced that those which rely 
on one action.  Rather, it is entirely dependent on the responsiveness of the organization and their ability to 
mobilize through exit, voice or both these mechanisms (Hirschman 1970: 121-122).  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The elusive optimal mix of exit and voice (Hirschman 1970: 121). 
Outside of the consumer-industry scenario, exit and voice correlate with political and economic 
ideals for social change. Initially, Hirschman saw exit more closely aligned with consumer decision-making 
and hence with market forces acting, and voice responses involving political contestation and public actions 
(Hirschman 1970: 15; Hirschman 1982: 65), though he later acknowledged that these were not exclusive.1 
Exit and voice responses have been widely analyzed in other contexts (Picciotto 2015: 1).2 I am concerned 
with applying them in a context of environmental contestation that can help us understand the possible 
difficulties that citizens may face in holding economic actors accountable for forms of pollution.  
Exit or "distancing" (Zuindeau 2009: 155), can be especially problematic for citizens facing 
proximate environmental issues. Firstly, exit is tied closely to the idea of loyalty (see Figure 2), a concept 
similar to trust (Hirschman 1992: 80-81) and which "…marks the attachment of the individual or the group 
to a product, an organization, or a territory" (Zuindeau 2009: 156). However, there is a visible difference 
between loyalty to a product and loyalty to one's employer, family or tribe which can "…be thought of as 
a 'group' with which one identifies" (Dowding et al. 2000: 476). This distinction is important because 'group' 
 
1 On social exit see Hirschman 1981: 223; 1992: 78, 96. On consumer use of voice see Hirschman 1982: 65. 
2 See Flew 2009 in relation media citizenship; Lindell (2010) in relation to the African informal economy and street 
traders; Lucero (2008) on indigenous political representation in the Andes, and Ramana (2013) on nuclear policy.  
Organisations whose 
members react strongly 
via 
Exit 
Yes No 
Voice 
Voluntary associations, competitive 
political parties, and some business 
enterprises, for example, those selling 
output to a few buyers 
Yes 
Family, tribe, nation, church, parties in 
non-totalitarian one-party systems  
No 
Parties in totalitarian one-party systems, 
terrorist groups, and criminal gangs  
Competitive business enterprise in 
relation to customers  
 
  
loyalty is influenced by how much one has invested in the region, or object or organization over time 
(Dowding et al. 2000: 477). Group loyalty (especially if it is strong) may prevent people exiting and 
distancing themselves from a particular location, e.g. a English person may feel strong loyalty to their 
country which nullifies the obvious choice of exit brought on by a deep disagreement with government 
policies (Dowding et al. 2000: 477). In the same way a family may be reluctant to leave their land despite 
a deteriorating environment, because it has been in their household for hundreds of years (Blaikie 1985: 
26-27).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Birch's version of Hirschman's loyalty concept (Birch 1974: 73) 
The underlying influences for people's loyalty have been traced by authors like Groves (2015) and 
Zunideau (2009) who's focus on "attachments" and so-called "second variables" (the positive or negative 
complementarity between economic issues and environmental issues3) to explain why people can be 
unwilling to exit. Individuals and groups may have emotional attachments to their environment and 
particular location around them, incorporating inter-personal relationships and life-world attachments that 
are historical as well as social (Broto 2013: 4; Groves 2015: 5-6). A pollution event may see a person take 
into consideration their health and those of their family "…versus keeping quiet to defend his economic 
interests, even disputing the legitimacy of the critical voices of others" (Zuindeau 2009: 162). While 
distancing oneself from the problem is a solution, it then becomes a question of comparing the 
delocalization-relocalisation costs e.g. the well-being advantages and the economic costs (e.g. daily 
transport expenditure) caused by distance (Zuindeau 2009: 162). 
It is highly likely that strong attachment through a range of attachments to a given area and the 
physical world around a person/group will help to limit the use of exit from a negative environmental 
scenario (dependent on the temporal context, discussed shortly) and instead increase the use of voice. 
Therefore, these complex and wide ranging life considerations (social, economic and potentially spiritual 
and cultural, including ethnicity) will constrain citizen use of exit for an environmental problem. This is 
most acute for marginalized people or groups as exit is unavailable to some due to income and wealth 
(Hirschman 1978: 95-96). Indeed, the use of exit by people who can financially afford to do so allows it to 
become an example of the "tyranny of small decisions"" as those exiting fail to take into account their 
responsibility to fight the infliction of a public bad on others (Hirschman 1992: 80 see also Hirschman 
1981: 243; 1978: 96-101). One's private self-interest that may extend as far as one's family (Dobson and 
Bell 2006: 2; Rousseau 2012) but not to community.  For some, this is a reflection of the dominance of the 
private sphere (work, home, family) in modern-day society over the public sphere and its "…practices of 
public service, citizen participation, loyalty to the community, and activity for the common good" (Barry 
2006: 36-37).  
The decision to exit has two consequences on voice. Firstly exit will "drive out" voice (Hirschman 
1970: 76) or deprive its potential carriers (Hirschman 1995: 13) "in the sense that the 'alert' who may have 
voiced, exit instead, leaving behind the 'inert' who then suffer in silence" (Dowding 2000: 472), a situation 
 
3 If the complementarity is positive, exit behaviour "will be high if one fears that the situation will deteriorate more, 
whereas it will be more limited if one expects that the situation will improve in the future (attitude of patience)." 
However, if the complementarity is negative but applies to others instead, the use of voice will be higher, but in 
positions where obstacles to voice are present (being a minority citizen for instance), the exit option is favoured 
(Zuindeau 2009: 162). 
Loyalty Voice (while 
staying) 
No loyalty Exit (in silence) 
Decline in quality  
  
Barry (1974: 91) labels "silent non-exit".4 Moreover, in affluent societies where privileged groups are seen 
to bear the greatest responsibility for taking action to combat the negative effects of their unsustainable 
lifestyles (Horton 2006: 128), exit can be labelled as a cop-out, an avoidance of their environmental 
responsibilities and the "politics of obligation" (Smith 1998). In an environmental pollution scenario, exit 
could see the continuation of pollution that could continue unchecked and/or affect other people that were 
unable to exit (so called "cumulative decline"; Hirschman 1992: 90). Zuindeaun (2009: 163) also suggests 
that the greater the geographic scope and magnitude of the problem, the more difficult it is to exit.  
Secondly, Hirschman originally saw that consumer exit will often only be taken "in the light of the 
prospects for the effective use of voice" (Hirschman 1970: 37). If consumers are sufficiently convinced of 
the effectiveness of voice, they may postpone exiting, as by doing so they lose the opportunity of using 
their voice (Hirschman 1970: 105). The reverse does not occur (Hirschman 1970: 37). If this is combined 
with the influence of loyalty and real-world attachments, it would suggest that in an environmental pollution 
scenario, exit is an action of last resort, which is particularly true if one considers the temporal aspect of 
loyalty and voice. Loyalty will hold exit at bay and activate voice (Hirschman 1970: 78) due to time 
horizons (Broto 2013: 10; Graham and Keeley 1992: 198). It is unlikely that a citizen would abruptly 
relocate to a different location at the first sign of a environmental problem without first voicing concerns 
and allowing time for a solution to be implemented.  
What can we conclude about exit in relation to an environmental pollution event? It would appear 
to be an action that is constrained by loyalty, which is itself influenced by a number of real-world 
attachments. Whilst it can be utilized by those with the means to do so, this can damage the voices of those 
left behind, and it fails to prevent the continuation of the pollution problem. Its relationship to voice can 
also be understood if one considers exit as an action of last resort, only taken by some after a period of time 
has elapsed in which the use of voice has failed to find a solution or when a person's loyalty and life 
attachments to their present location are weaker. One can already see that the consumer-industry voice 
scenario can be rethought and extended to account for the responses experienced to environmental 
problems. 
*** 
In the original premise, consumers have different perceptions of the quality of products (Hirschman 
1970: 48) which may impact upon their willingness to voice over issues with quality or supply. However, 
the situation in relation to citizens and the quality of the environment is very different. While voice was 
seen as a costly option for consumers (Hirschman 1970:40), the action will have an edge over the use of 
exit in situations that impinge on public interest (Hirschman 1982: 6-7) such as a food health hazard, an 
automobile safety problem (Hirschman 1981: 217) or conceivably an environmental problem. Indeed, the 
public interest surrounding the environment is clear; many governments now incorporate a right to a healthy 
environment in their constitutions while various branches of the UN have adopted similar positions (UN 
2007; UN Mandate on Human Rights and the Environment). This reinforces the declaration that citizen's 
deserve "…adequate conditions of life, in an environment that permits a life of dignity and well-being" 
(United Nations Environment Programme 1972 Principle 1).  
Moreover, for citizens themselves, the use of voice is extremely relevant for an environmental 
problem as "everyone has a strong motivation to defend the quality of life at his own station" (Hirschman 
1970: 53). This issue will attract degree of public interest (dependent on the context, i.e. its severity), which 
will undoubtedly cause a strong degree of feeling over desired outcomes (i.e. an end to the pollution), that 
would help to outweigh the uncertainty that people may feel over participation (Hirschman 1981: 216; 
Zuindeau 2009). Thus, public participation through voice empowers citizens as they seek a stronger role in 
decisions that affect their lives (Zimmerman and Rappaport 1988, cited in Laurian 2004: 53).  
Lastly is Hirschman's exploration of voice in political/public action scenarios. There is an 
'individual' and 'collective' voice and there are 'horizontal' and 'vertical' voices, all of which are interlinked 
and which reinforce the connection between voice and environmental problems. The exploration of voice 
in a political/public action scenario highlights that the functioning of voice depends upon the "potential for 
 
4 This conclusion is not applicable in all cases, however. See Birch (1974: 77) on public and private schools and the 
"exit plus voice" idea discussed by Barry (1974: 92).  
  
collective action" (Hirschman 1992: 79) as opposed to a person's singular voice.5 This is linked to the 
division of voice between horizontal and vertical settings (Le Meur et al. 2013; O'Donnell 1986; Ravnborg 
and Gomez 2014). Horizontal voice refers to communication with other actors who share some form of 
collective identity at the same level whilst vertical voice refers to communication with actors at different 
levels of society, like government (O'Donnell 1986: 251; Ravnborg and Gomez 2014: 73) and other 
economic actors (e.g. REIs). Crucially it is most often collective in political situations (O'Donnell 1986). 
Horizontal voice can be more important than vertical voice owing to its necessity as a precondition for the 
latter (O'Donnell 1986: 251-252; Ravnborg and Gomez 2014: 73). 
Environmental problems are most often dealt with through vertical political channels that lend 
themselves to the strengths of collective voice, made up of the 'pool' of people affected by pollution. 
Individuals faced with a vertical hierarchy know that they will not be able to "…achieve powerful speech, 
a legitimate, known, recognized, authorized and authoritative voice" (Bourdieu 1986: 301) without 
collectively pooling their voice in an indirect fashion.  
Indeed, the study of voice reveals that its use by citizens "…depends upon their belief in its expected 
efficacy" (Dowding et al. 2000: 473) which suggests that analysis must specify the "contextual 
assumptions" (O'Donnell 1986: 250) of its use and the outcomes it will have. The next section sets out the 
contextual environment for voice, and reveals that its use by citizens is dependent on and influenced by 
specific temporal, economic, social and geographical factors that are studied by political ecologists; the 
'political ecology of voice.' 
 
4. The contextual factors that influence citizens exercising voice  
 
[T]he use of voice can suddenly become a most sought after, fulfilling activity, in fact, the 
ultimate justification of human existence.. (Hirschman 1981: 215) 
 
While we have established that the functioning and formation of voice depend on the prospects for 
collective action. A citizen's ability to do this rests partly "upon their legal rights" in their country (Dowding 
et al. 2000: 473), a reflection that voice can be hazardous where organizations (and the state) make efforts 
to silence protests (Hirschman 1981: 244). O'Donnell's (1986: 251-252) vertical and horizontal divisions 
are based on this assumption. The utilization of horizontal voice without major restriction is identified with 
democratic and non-repressive contexts, also permitting the exercise of collective vertical voice (O'Donnell 
1986: 251-252).  
The application of environmental voice by citizens is directly affected by the national political 
environment in which they live and operate, and their "opportunity" to do so (Tilly 1978: 55). "Opportunity 
describes the relationship between the population's interests and the current state of the world around it" 
(Tilly 1978: 55) and one can begin to understand this if consideration is given to political freedoms (Sen 
2001: 38, 152), and the influence that authoritarian versus democratic states have on voice. In authoritarian 
countries, extreme regimes will suppress vertical and horizontal voice in order to gain power and stability 
through the conversion of "…citizens into isolated, wholly private, and narrowly self-centered individuals" 
(Hirschman 1992: 82). The former Soviet Union's Great Terror is given as an example by Kuromiya (2007). 
Meanwhile, in democracies, stronger civic and legal laws protect freedom of speech and dissent, with 
equality and meaningful participation remaining central to democratic participation (Verba et al. 1995: 1). 
Thus, "…it is easier to participate in a public protest when one only loses time through the act of 
participation than when one thereby risks losing one's head" (Hirschman 1982: 4-5). Moreover, the state's 
political system and societal freedom has a significant impact on the ability of citizens and other actors like 
NGOs to hold economic actors accountable for pollution. For instance, in Burma, the authoritarian regime's 
"business as usual" (Bryant 1996) approach to environmental management left people with few options for 
dissent, and environmental politics was a type of resistance politics (Doyle and Simpson 2006). 
The links between voice and political ecology is visible here. The capacity of citizens to voice is 
based on the retention or (unequal) diffusion of power by the state to particular social groups or actors in 
 
5 Individual voice refers to "actions where the intention of the individual in acting is to bring about the desired effect 
solely through that action." Collective action is "where the intention of the individual in acting is to contribute to the 
desired effect through that action" (Dowding et. al. 2000: 473), in pursuit of a common goal (Tilly 1978: 7). 
  
society. Consequently, PEV must analyze the wider national political environment in which the 
environmental pollution is occurring in order to establish the levels of voice permitted by citizens; a 
democratic country with freedom of speech will tolerate a higher level (or ceiling), Hirschman argues 
(Hirschman 1981: 224).6   
A study of voice from this state political perspective also suggests not all EMaDEs are alike. For 
example, while Latin American countries all "…share a common basis in law, language, history, culture, 
sociology, colonial experience, and overall political patterns that enable us to discuss the region in general 
terms", they are different (Wiarda and Kline 2001: 1). There are diverse national laws and regulations, 
distinct social strata, income levels and opportunity, separate histories and customs etc. in which citizens 
live and also apply their voice. This is a crucial point. Though events like hydrocarbon conflicts may have 
similar causes and effects across countries and regions, each case needs to be analyzed in relation to the 
specific socio-political and economic environment (Vasquez 2014: xvii), a conclusion also applicable to 
other relevant events like development project outcomes (Ballet and Randrianalijaona 2014: 218). Any 
investigation into the issues surrounding voice vis-à-vis environmental problems cannot be generalized. 
In order for citizens' voice to function effectively, individuals will need to possess reserves of 
political influence that they can call upon when sufficiently provoked (Hirschman 1970: 70-71). Despite 
political influence not being a necessary precondition for consumer voice, within the environmental context 
it would appear to be key for two interlinked reasons. The wider collective scalar impact of environmental 
problems and the actors involved (a variable combination including international agencies, NGOs, national 
and local government mechanisms, and private industry) highlights that an individual citizen's voice, and 
its influence, rests to a greater degree on their political influence and ability to engage with these actors. 
While horizontal voice is seen by some to be far less costly and has the psychological benefit of expressing 
and sharing (again dependent on the context), vertical voice is more costly and has some psychological 
costs (the stress of speaking critically to one's superiors), suggesting those with a stronger political influence 
will stand a greater chance of success (Soete and Weehuizen 2003: 27). Sen argues illiteracy can cause 
hindrance to political participation (Sen 2001: 39). The instrumental freedom of social opportunity offered 
by better education, healthcare etc. increases the effective participation in economic and political matters 
(Sen 2001).  
Sociodemographic studies show that the time, effort, and money needed for effective participation 
are often borne by those with more resources (Dahl 1961: 274) and political confidence (Dahl 1961: 286-
293), which leaves the most effective interest groups in local politics as high-income and upper-middle-
class citizens (Dahl 1961: 273, 282-283; Hirschman 1981: 214; Laurian 2004: 55; Verba et al. 1995: 288-
303). Sen cautions against making generalised links between income and individual achievements and 
freedoms, owing to personal social and economic circumstances that impact on the ability of certain citizens 
to utilize their voice (Sen 2001: 38-39 and ch. 4).7 
In socially unequal countries (e.g. in Latin America) these issues have particular salience. The level 
of influence that certain groups and individuals can exert on the authorities and on political decisionmaking  
depends on a strong voice and position in society and benefiting from the rule of law (Vasquez 2014: 47). 
Low EMaDEs scores in Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index rankings indicate a lack 
of confidence and trust that there ae fair and effective governmental institutions (Vasquez 2014: 47). This 
may mean less willingness to participate confidently and to seek influence through voice and other methods 
(Wiarda and Kline 2001: 46-47).8 
The application of voice by those in a more marginalized societal position becomes extremely 
difficult. This is particularly true of indigenous and ethnic peoples, that have borne the brunt of European 
colonization (see Varese 1996) and like other weak/marginalized global citizens are hit hard by the costs 
of environmental problems (Bryant and Bailey 1997: 40; Reed 2002: 213). Natural resource extraction 
projects (particularly oil and gas) and possible environmental pollution can often occur in close proximity 
 
6 One must add however that this ceiling will have a limit on the extent of voice and exit as "…there are levels of exit 
(disintegration) and voice (disruption) beyond which it is impossible for an organisation to exist as an organisation" 
(Hirschman 1981: 224).   
7 Dahl (1966: 284) does caution that even though citizens with lower incomes are much less likely to participate in 
local decisions than citizens with larger incomes, "…there are so many more of them in the first group that a smaller 
proportion of them can amount to an aggregate greater than the group of participants with larger incomes."  
8 Though this is contested (see Gamson 1968 cited in Laurian 2004: 57). 
  
and in remote locations like the Amazon rainforest. Elite manipulation of the state has serious impacts on 
equality "…because economically disadvantaged groups lack the tools [such as a strong social position and 
voice] for accessing the authorities through parallel channels" (Vasquez 2014: 47).  
Through PEV, research must extend towards the positon of the citizens affected by pollution, not 
just through an examination of the national social trends (i.e. level of inequality). Following Sen and others, 
actual citizen accessibility to voice mechanisms requires more detailed investigation. Laurian (2004: 54) 
argues that the nature of the problem in her U.S study (the siting of toxic waste sites) and the high-costs of 
clean-up necessitates the involvement of federal, state, and local government agencies all of which are (at 
least in theory) "…officially committed to increasing public participation in planning." A similar conclusion 
is applicable to other environmental problems and the role of various political agencies at different spatial 
levels; the scale, severity and nature of an environmental problem requires coordinated responses between 
local, provincial and national government mechanisms and the ability to integrate citizen's voices at each 
level. However, while democratic states should (theoretically) be able to provide citizens with multiple 
points of voice accessibility at different spatial scales (local, regional and national levels) and in different 
formats (community meetings, ICT-methods), it is clear that this is variable in term of geography and across 
social groups.  
In a general sense, authors have noted that EMaDEs lack the ability of the advanced economies to 
be able to shift resources more quickly into desired areas (Stolper 1966: 205). Education and healthcare 
involve recurrent costs, and staffing problems set a limit on what can be done, particularly in remoter 
geographic locations (Stolper 1966: 215 see also Reed 2002: 212). "In the first place, it needs to be restated 
that [while] space qua space has no casual power and spatial relations of themselves do not produce effects" 
(Slater 1989: 13), "depending on the nature of the constituents, their spatial relations may make a crucial 
difference" but only in terms of "the particular casual powers and liabilities constituting it" (Sayer 1985: 
52 cited in Slater 1989: 13).  A key constituent that influences these spatial relations is the nation state.  
The relationship between central decision making mechanisms and those in frontiers or more 
remotely located territories is a key issue for political ecologists. A key line of investigation is to consider 
how far the spatial locality of decisions surrounding environmental management or natural resource 
projects influence voice and participation, as well as citizen access to businesses and their decision-making 
mechanisms or modes of communication. 
One can turn back to Hirschman here for initial guidance. The author concluded that certain "strict 
limits" are placed on citizens regarding their "…involvement in public affairs as certain political institutions 
[and arguably business] keep them from expressing the full intensity of their feelings" (Hirschman 1982: 
103). So whilst firms do not stop a citizen's ability to use voice, they may withhold or control access to key 
decision making mechanisms, and evidence of this can be seen through two illustrative REI extraction 
projects. In Peru, environmental regulation sets out the parameters of prior consultation between REIs and 
indigenous peoples (Regulation, Environmental Protection, Hydrocarbon Activities, DS 015-2006-EM in 
Powers 2012: 8). However, a study of the Perina Project (a large open-pit gold mine in the Peruvian Amazon 
owned and operated by Barrick Gold Corporation of Canada), shows how the "neoliberalisation of resource 
governance" has seen the production of: 
 
…new spatial relations of governance at the point of extraction;  the community relations 
office, now a critical node of decision-making regarding the livelihood impacts of mining in 
adjacent communities, is located on mine property, behind a closely guarded gate. (Himley 
2008: 446) 
 
It is clear that the firm and not the state administers access to a crucial site for decision-making, and 
the capacity to do so is enabled by private property rights. Similarly, in Madagascar, the QMM mining 
project saw criticism over the low levels of local population involvement in the project in the late 1980s, 
and a restricted participatory process that did not necessarily represent diverse societal opinions (Ballet and 
Randrianalijoana 2014: 222). 
What can we conclude from these two brief examples? REI decision making mechanisms have been 
key practical problems for firms (Reed 2002: 220). Historically, Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities 
have lacked effective participation in decision-making. Reed argues that while firms are willing to consult 
with local communities, to take their concerns into consideration and possibly modify their plans, they are 
  
not willing to include local communities into decision-making mechanisms or to consider the possibility 
that local community desires might take precedence over those of the REIs, a process termed "decoupling" 
(Backer 2007: 33-34; Reed 2002: 221 my italics. See also Cragg and Greenbaum 2002).  
Part of the problem is that capitalist firms seek to maximize profit and to reduce costs (some of 
which are incurred by protests, and shareholder actions) (Reed 2002: 222). They will consider the costs and 
benefits of various actors (e.g. local citizens, NGOs, financiers like shareholders, banks, multilateral 
lending agencies) but ignore the interests (and voices) of some while paying attention to others (Kapelus 
2002: 291). This leaves local participants relying on the conscience of corporations to respond to concerns 
as moral demands, which can instead often see firms seek to quell voice through special favors (Hirschman 
1981: 240-241), violent suppression or the funding of alternative movements (Rowell 1996). Non-state 
economic actors are able to control and manage the parameters of voice for citizens (where, when, how, 
their frequency of contact) regardless of the wider state environment in which people reside. 
A more accurate depiction of the relevant economic actors in question is important, especially if 
these are private businesses, and this can be illustrated for oil companies. Vasquez (2014: 123-124) has 
suggested that each have their own unique operating styles which differ "…greatly in the way they 
incorporate environmental and social safeguards and on the degree of significance they grant to these." 
Through their more secure financial position larger REIs have more investment in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and larger professional teams of community relations specialists (Vasquez 2014: 124-
127). So the level, accessibility and therefore strength of citizen voices will be different depending on the 
REI. The type of REI impacts upon voice and accessibility (see Figure 3) and this is a starting point for 
investigation of their social effects. A similar process can also be conducted for other economic actors, 
including a pervasive force in Latin America, mining companies.  
Lastly, and interlinked to all of these points is the fact that voice changes over time (see Corbin and 
Strauss 1990: 5), as Hirschman's original focus on the consumer-industry relationship did recognize (see 
Pitt et al. 2002). Changes in national political environments, e.g. the weakening of an authoritarian regime, 
will open up previously unavailable choices for citizens through their new-found rights, increasing the 
likelihood of vocal behavior (Hirschman 1995: 14). Social position, economic wealth and opportunity can 
change over the life course, depending on the context. Similarly, the interactions between economic actors 
and citizens will change dependent on new business laws and regulations on consultation, and changes in 
shareholder aims and values. Again, the links between voice and political ecology concerns are noticeable. 
Analysis of voice at one temporal moment will only provide a 'snapshot' on citizen voice at that time. Other 
variables also change. The work of the 'present' must be situated and related to the past. 
Understanding of history also leads citizens to deploy what they feel are the most effective methods 
to utilize in pursuing their goals, environmental or otherwise. Two broad types of voice action require 
mention. The first is 'radical voice' such as demonstrations, riots and revolutions, categorized by Hirschman 
(1971: 5-6) as "participatory explosions" for "which there are no parallels." Zuindeau's (2009: 158) research 
underscores how different forms and levels of violence encompass voice actions which Herring's inherency 
theory suggests are taken when some political challengers (e.g. marginalized groups) are denied access to 
the privileges and advantages available to others (Herring 1989: 139). The use of violence will greatly 
increase the likelihood that the event will be noticed, which may help efforts to force through changes (Tilly 
1978: 92). One can see an illustration of this in Bolivia where the 2000 'Water War' and 2003 'Gas War' 
saw protestors reject the restructuring and re-scaling of resource governance under recent neoliberal 
reforms. Through protests, blockades and resistance they sought procedural and distributive justice 
(Perreault 2006). 
 
 
Size of REI operations 
(based on number of 
individual and shared 
operations with other private 
and state owned REIs). This 
encompasses oil and gas 
operations 
Privately operated REIs 
(majority stake owned by private 
business interests)  
Term in italics  
 
State run REIs  
(majority stake owned by 
nation(s) 
Term in italics  
 
  
International (or trans-
national): REIs with 
single/shared business 
operations in at least thirty 
countries   
"Trans national resource 
extraction industries" (TNREIs) 
e.g. BP, ConocoPhillips, Exon, 
Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Total 
"State owned trans national 
resource extraction industries" 
(SOTNREIs) e.g. China National 
Petroleum Corporation  
 
Regional: REIs with 
international single/shared 
operations focused in less than 
thirty countries  
"Regional resource extraction 
industries" (RREIs)  e.g. Chevron, 
Hunt Oil Company, Premier Oil 
Company, Tullow Oil 
"State owned regional resource 
extraction industries" (SORREIs) 
e.g. Petrobas (Brazil), Pluspetrol 
(Argentina), Sinopec Corps 
(China) 
National/ local: REIs with 
individual/shared operations 
in a single country  
"National resource extraction 
industries" (NREIs);  
 
"State owned national resource 
extraction industries" (SONREIs) 
e.g. Gazprom (Russia), Pemex 
(Mexico), Saudi Aramco (Saudi 
Arabia), Petroperu (Peru)  
 
Figure 3: Typology of resource extraction industries (REI) 
 
A study of these events, or "critical moments" (Khan 2013) can help to reveal the causes of these 
actions. In Latin America for instance, the failure to strengthen the democratic system and to create a strong 
and equitable state presence has set limits on open participation for self-expression. This has prevented 
violence and other radical means being used as a way to voice grievances or to seek justice (Berkman 2007: 
8; Vasquez 2014: 53-54). People are not violent because they are poor, but rather because the long-term 
segregation within "neighborhoods of concentrated poverty" and across generations causes people to adapt 
to conditions of deprivation that see them "come to rely on violence as a basic tool for survival" (Sanchez 
R 2006: 181).  
Radical voice is not confined to marginalised social groups. Violence and resistance is generally a 
last resort for people whose peaceful attempts at redress are frustrated or ignored (Zahar 2006: 50) (an issue 
that is more acute for citizens in authoritarian countries), an example of which can be seen in the 1996 
citizen's rebellion in the Mexican town of Tepotzlan over the imposition of top-down 'development' by 
unresponsive elected officials and developers (Simon 1998). Still, for peripheral and mainstream social 
groups, care must be taken in the application of radical voice as "…people might forget their deferential 
obligations and let voice get carried away" which may hinder long term efforts at securing a particular goal 
where less flexible vertical political mechanisms frustrate grassroots interests (Adelman 2013: 443). 
This leads neatly into the second key type of voice action. Collective voice can go some way to 
combating the difficulties that disadvantaged groups, those without influence or those forced to use 
violence, can face in their consultations with government and other economic actors. Where there is 
environmental pollution resulting from resource extraction, one can differentiate "…between groups [or 
stakeholders] that have a legal, moral or presumed claim on the firm and groups that have an ability to 
influence the firm's behaviour, direction, process, or outcomes" (Mitchell et al. 1997: 859). The former 
include citizens with a local or direct 'stake' in the issue or event, and supportive community based 
organisations (Bourdieu 1986: 301). The latter include local, national or international NGOs and other 
global citizens (who are perhaps connected to a campaign run by the NGO) with a range of objectives (e.g. 
environmental protection, human rights) that lead them to lobby REIs and business actors. These are 
different 'voices' but interconnected. 
Vasquez's (2014: 90) research found "…that a unified indigenous voice usually allows for a faster 
resolution of oil and gas conflicts", able to use the prevailing sociopolitical climate to its advantage. A 
global network of collective voice actors now operate with a focus on redress for environmental issues 
(Kapelus 2002: 277), supporting communities through their international presence (Lipschutz 1997: 90-
91). Their ability to mobilise communities at the grass-roots level is important, especially in locations where 
  
there are unequal power relations between communities and other actors (see for example Boele et al. 2001: 
83) while their capacity to also work closely with business can help to ensure they utilise more responsible 
environmental behaviour (Reed 2002: 207).  Celebrities and other high profile individuals can also lend 
their weight to environmental campaigns in an effort to strengthen local collective voice (Brosius 2006). 
In some situations, local citizens risk becoming "dispossessed" of their own voice, "…deprived of 
an expression which specifically expresses" themselves and their own interests which are "…denied and 
annulled, by the common voice, the opinion communis as produced and uttered by the accredited 
spokesperson" (Bourdieu 1986: 301-302).  Thus, whilst political parties have been seen as offering the best 
means for societally excluded citizens to have their interests heard, parties can cater predominantly to elite 
interests (Stiefel and Wolf 1994: 139-140). 
Within groups, a campaign can also cater to elites as Hirschman notes (Hirschman 1981:242-243). 
He typifies this as the "treachery of voice" where changes achieved through voice are primarily in the 
interests of the few, a factor which may constrain individuals from participating in collective voice 
situations (1981: 244). Communities must be able to hold NGOs and their other supporters accountable but 
downward accountability can be weak, for example when the NGO pursues a technical campaign strategy 
unfamiliar to local actors (Ebrahim 2003; Kamat 2004: 167).  
Through applying PEV, the possibilities for, and strength of individual citizen voice can be 
investigated. This is a good starting point from which the political ecology of a struggle or a campaign may 
be understood in context and in relation to cause(s) of these actions. For example is it driven by social 
position or structural flaws in the state system? A range of real-world contextual influences on voice are 
placed together in Figure 4. Each of these requires investigation in order to build up a strong assessment of 
the use of voice and the potential barriers that may be faced by various stakeholders in their efforts at 
holding economic actors accountable for pollution problems. 
Figure 4: The political ecology of voice (PEV 
The theoretical rationale for 
applying voice to 
environmental problems  
-Citizen’s willing to voice to 
defend their own quality of life. 
-Loyalty (to a territory) will 
hold exit at bay and activate 
voice. This is influenced by a 
person’s time horizons e.g. 
won’t immediately exit to give 
time for a solution. 
-Public interest problems (like 
pollution) will see voice benefit 
some people at some time that 
help outweigh individual cost 
(time, effort, money) of use. 
- The solutions to environmental 
problems generally occur 
through vertical political 
settings which are most 
successfully influenced through 
collective voice. Environmental 
pollution impacts a collective 
(variably sized) group of 
citizens creating a collective 
voice. 
 
Real-world contextual 
influences on voice which 
require investigation 
 
Geographical location and 
technological access   
Geographical location of 
individual/collective group will 
influence their access to vertical 
power structures or those they 
seek to voice to. This also 
applies to technological access 
which can strengthen or limit 
voice access. 
 
Non-state actors’ involvement 
-Industries (e.g. REIs) and their 
respective companies can each 
have different access 
arrangements for people to 
voice. This will influence how 
successful individual/collective 
voice will be  
-Collective groups that represent 
citizens (CBOs, NGOs) 
influence citizen voice and their 
choice of action.   
Socio-economic and racial 
influences  
-The stronger a person’s societal 
position and ability to meet 
participatory costs (time, effort, 
money), the stronger their 
ability to voice and access and 
influence voice mechanisms. 
This means that marginalised 
citizens (e.g. indigenous groups 
or ethnic minorities) who are in 
lower social positions will often 
have a weaker voice and may 
face difficulties meeting 
participatory costs. These 
problems are accentuated in 
socially unequal countries. 
-The higher an individual’s level 
of political influence, the greater 
their chance of success in 
vertical voice situations. 
 
 
 
Political (state) environment 
Voice shaped by physical 
political environment in which it 
operates i.e. democratic vs. 
authoritarian regimes.   
 
 
 
 
Time  
Voice is not applied within a 
static temporal time-period. 
Changes in political 
environment will 
increase/decrease opportunity 
for voice.    
 
4. Conclusion: applying voice to an environmental problem    
This article has shown that Hirschman's theory of exit and voice has an important role to play in 
relation to understanding responses to environmental pollution. The study of voice is a truly multi-faceted 
process and one that offers strong integration into political ecology's efforts to understand the causes and 
possible solutions to environmental degradation. Through PEV, researchers can explore the temporally 
specific economic, social, and geographical environment in which various stakeholders are able to operate 
and use their voice. This can be applied to a specific case and its context. Stakeholder voice has been shown 
to be influenced by power relations in various relationships (state-citizens, businesses-citizens, CBO/NGO-
states, CBO/NGO-citizens, CBO/NGOs-business) and is linked to the control of, and thus access to, 
decision-making mechanisms. Crucially, these relationships surrounding access are influenced not only by 
the wider macro-political environment but also more localized power relationships involving firms which 
have the greatest power in dictating the scope and frequency of consultations with citizens and other non-
state stakeholders.  
Access to decision-making mechanisms is also linked to spatial scale and locality, and the type of 
voice mechanism utilized by the state and business actors. These have a significant bearing on stakeholder 
trust, their willingness to participate, and the type of voice action they utilize. The study of voice requires 
a focus on these macro and micro influences. The political ecology of voice offers an innovative angle from 
which to view the responses made to significant environmental issues and problems.   
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